New York Criminal Attorney Blog

Driving While Intoxicated Per Se In Violation of VTL 1192(2): Sufficiency of Information: Information Must Contain First-Hand, Non-Hearsay Evidence Regarding Breath Test Result

November 13, 2011 | Tilem & Associates

In New York there are two different Driving While Intoxicated charges. Driving While Intoxicated under VTL 1192(3) is based upon the officer’s opinion that a motorist is intoxicated. This charge is independent of one’s Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) and is referred to as common law DWI. The other Driving While Intoxicated charge in New York is based solely upon one’s BAC being at or above .08 as determined by a chemical test such as a breathalyzer type test and is found at VTL 1192(2). This charge is independent of a motorists level of intoxication. That is to say if a motorist is able to handle the vehicle flawlessly they are still guilty of DWI by virtue of their blood alcohol level.
When one is charged under VTL 1192(2) based upon a BAC of .08 or above, the allegation of a BAC of .08 or above must be supported by non-hearsay evidence. What is called the accusatory instrument will be deemed insufficient if the allegation regarding the .08 BAC is not supported by non-hearsay evidence. In other words, it is insufficient for one officer to allege that the defendant’s BAC was .08 unless that officer administered the test or witnessed the test.
For example, in People v Bonner (Lisa), 31 Misc. 3d 142A (App. Term 2nd Dept. 2011), the Court found the Information (accusatory instrument) insufficient where Officer
Montemurro alleged that defendant’s breath test result revealed a .16% BAC but he did not state that he had administered the test, or observed the test being conducted. Furthermore, the Intoxilyzer 5000 printout card which had allegedly been annexed to the information for the breathalyzer test result included the signature of another officer who had conducted the breathalyzer test. Further, the printout that was signed by another officer did not attest to any personal knowledge nor was it properly verified.
Accordingly, the Court found that the lower court should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss because “[t]he information did not set forth nonhearsay allegations which, if true, established every element, and defendant’s commission thereof, of the offense charged.” Id.

Driving While Intoxicated Per Se In Violation of VTL 1192(2): Sufficiency of Information: Information Must Contain First-Hand, Non-Hearsay Evidence Regarding Breath Test Result

October 7, 2011 | Tilem & Associates

In New York there are two different Driving While Intoxicated charges. Driving While Intoxicated under VTL 1192(3) is based upon the officer’s opinion that a motorist is intoxicated. This charge has nothing to do with one’s Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) and is referred to as common law DWI. The other Driving While Intoxicated charge in New York is based solely upon one’s BAC being at or above .08 as determined by a chemical test such as a breathalyzer type test and is found at VTL 1192(2).
When one is charged under VTL 1192(2) based upon a BAC of .08 or above, the allegation of a BAC of .08 or above must be supported by non-hearsay evidence. What is called the accusatory instrument will be deemed insufficient if the allegation regarding the .08 BAC is not supported by non-hearsay evidence. In other words, it is insufficient for one officer to allege that the defendant’s BAC was .08 unless that officer administered the test or witnessed the test.
For example, in People v Bonner (Lisa), 31 Misc. 3d 142A (App. Term 2nd Dept. 2011), the Court found the Information (accusatory instrument) insufficient where Officer
Montemurro alleged that defendant’s breath test result revealed a .16% BAC but he did not state that he had administered the test, or observed the test being conducted. Furthermore, the Intoxilyzer 5000 printout card which had allegedly been annexed to the information for the breathalyzer test result included the signature of another officer who had conducted the breathalyzer test. Further, the printout that was signed by another officer did not attest to any personal knowledge nor was it properly verified.
Accordingly, the Court found that the lower court should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss because “[t]he information did not set forth nonhearsay allegations which, if true, established every element, and defendant’s commission thereof, of the offense charged.” Id.

NEW YORK POST ARTICLE – SOMETIMES VICTIMS NEED LAWYERS ALSO

September 28, 2011 | Jasmine Hernandez

As criminal defense lawyers most of the time we represent the rights of the accused but sometimes we are called upon to represents the right of a victim. In the typical case, the victim report a crime to the police, the police investigate, make an arrest and the case is referred to the District Attorney’s Office. The victim needs no lawyer because the prosecutor will prosecute the case and often assist the victim in getting compensation from the perpetrator or the Crime Victim’s Assistance Fund.

However, all too often, especially in New York City, criminal cases are not handled in the typical way leaving victim’s to fend for themselves. In a recent case handled by this office and as reported in the New York Post yesterday, an individual who was ripped off by a car dealership and whose signature was forged on loan documents for a car was repeatedly denied the right to make a police report by the New York City Police Department. With no police report, no investigation and no arrest its as if the crime did not occur and the victim must deal with the consequences, in this case a monthly car loan bill that he didn’t bargain for, by himself.

By getting an experience criminal defense lawyer involved we were able to file complaints, with the Bank that issued the loan, the New York State Attorney General’s Office, credit reporting agencies such as TRW, Experian and Equifax and the United States Federal Trade Commission. In addition, we are working on getting the loan rescinded. As a result of our work the Bank has already terminated its relationship with the car dealership which has more than 40 complaints against it to the New York Department of Consumer Affairs.

The practice of not taking police reports is unfortunate but also wide spread as has been reported on several occasions by the New York Post and other Newspapers. It appears to be a result of a combination of laziness, sometimes ignorance and is also a symptom of how the Police Department tracks crime statistics. Simply put, if there is no police report the crime didn’t happen so crime must be going down. But the practice endangers the public and causes inconvenience and expense for the victims.

Here is a dealership that has over 40 complaints against it and rather than investigating what is happening, the police allow this dealership to continue to rip people off. Sometimes, the consequences of not taking a report or investigating a crime can be even more severe. Its at those times that an experienced New York Criminal defense lawyer can help.

WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE FOCUSES ATTENTION ON OVERCRIMINALIZATION IN FEDERAL LAW

September 27, 2011 | Jasmine Hernandez

An article in today’s Wall Street Journal entitled “As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines” focuses public attention on two trends that has long been followed by Federal Criminal Defense lawyers and has raised concerns among civil rights advocates and attorneys. The first trend, involving the rapid and uncontrolled growth of federal crimes (as distinguished from state crimes like murder, rape, assault, etc) has seen the number of federal crimes rise from just 20 to about 4500. The other trend is the erosion of the proof necessary to prove many federal crimes and send someone to prison.

The uncontrolled growth of federal criminal statutes has resulted in many individuals who are clearly not criminals getting caught up in the criminal justice systems for acts that they were clearly not aware constituted crimes. In legal thought there are generally considered two types of crimes. Crimes that are called in Latin malum in se, meaning wrong in itself are crimes that are generally obvious or inherently wrong or evil such as murder, stealing, assault or rape. The other type of crimes are called malum prohibitum in Latin, meaning wrong as prohibited are those crimes which are wrong only because they are prohibited by a statute such as gun possession, drug possession, copy write infringement, tax evasion or illegal immigration.

Since most crimes that are malum in se crimes, the obvious ones, have already been illegal, the new crimes are the malum prohibitum crimes, the crimes that are not so obvious. To make matters worse, according to the Wall Street Journal article, federal criminal offenses are not limited to one section of federal law but are scattered among 42 of the 51 titles of the United States Code. That means there is no one place where you can look to see if your acts are illegal. So the combination of having non obvious criminal offenses scattered all around the law results in frequent accidental transgressions of sometimes serious laws.

NEW YORK SPEEDY TRIAL – Part IV – The Defendant’s Consent to an Adjournment Must be Clear.

August 27, 2011 | Jasmine Hernandez

As we have discussed in previous blogs New York has a speedy trial statute than when used by a knowledgeable and experienced criminal defense lawyer can often help get a case dismissed or effect a better plea bargain. Often, when litigation begins over whether the “speedy trial clock” has run out on the prosecution, the prosecutor will try to claim that certain adjournments are excludeable from speedy trial calculations because the defendant had consented to the adjournment.

Adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay. Defense counsel’s failure to object to the adjournment or failure to appear does not constitute consent. People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676, 678 (N.Y. 1993).

Defendant’s Failure to Object to Adjournment Not Consent: A mere failure by defense counsel to object to an adjournment does not constitute “consent” within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (4) (b). People v Liotta (79 NY2d 841, 843),
Defendant’s Agreeing to a New Date or Notice of a New Date Not Consent:

Defense counsel’s reply “That’s fine” is not deemed consent to an adjournment where court indicated it would notify the parties of the date by mail. “That’s fine” was simply an agreement to the method court would use to notify parties – it was not consent to adjournment. People v Brown, 69 A.D.3d 871 (2nd Dept. 2010) see also People v. Nunez, 47 A.D.3d 545 (1st Dept. 2008)(“Although defense counsel said “fine” in response to the trial court’s suggestion of August 21 as an adjourned date, in context this amounted to a representation that such date was not inconvenient, but did not imply consent.”).

Defense Counsel Participating in Picking New Date Not Consent to Adjournment
In People v D.D., the court found that counsel’s response to the court’s questions about a convenient adjourn date did not qualify as defense counsel actively participating in setting that date such that consent to adjourn could be inferred and the time would be subject to exclusion. 2010 NY Slip Op 50837U, 4, 27 Misc. 3d 1221A (FN 2)(N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2010).

In addition, a delay caused by plea negotiations is only excludable if the defense requested or consented to the delay. People v. Manning, 52 A.D.3d 1295 (4th Dept. 2008).

A defendant without counsel must not be deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he has been advised by the court of his rights under these rules and the effect of his consent. CPL 30.30(4)(b). Therefore, unless an unrepresented defendant is specifically advised of his right to a speedy trial and the consequences of his consent he may not be deemed to have consented even if he indicates that he is consenting to an adjournment.

In the end, It is the People’s burden to ensure, in the first instance, that the record of the proceedings at which the adjournment was actually granted is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering the subsequent CPL 30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should be charged. Where the People fail to satisfy this primary obligation, they must assume responsibility for the delay that follows the adjournment. People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 215-216 (N.Y. 1992) see also People v. Reyes (Carlos), 24 Misc. 3d 51, 55 (N.Y. App. Term 2009)(“As the People failed to satisfy their burden of creating a record establishing that the period from August 10, 2005, to September 28, 2005, is excludeable on the basis of consent, and as they have established no other ground for its exclusion, it must be charged to them.” In other words if there is an ambiguity in the record, the People will be charged for the adjournment.

NEW YORK’s ASSAULT WEAPON BAN – Part III

August 20, 2011 | Jasmine Hernandez

In the first two parts in our series of blogs on New York’s assault weapon ban we discussed the absolute silliness in banning firearms based upon certain cosmetic features. Now we discuss the most troubling part of the ban from the perspective of the citizen who finds himself charged under New York law with possessing an Assault Weapon or the experienced criminal defense lawyer who takes on the responsibility of defending the citizen.

Penalties

Generally, possession of a so called “assault weapon” in New York is a violation of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree under New York Penal Law sec 265.02 (7). Possession of a “Large Capacity Ammunition Feeding Device” is a violation of Penal Law sec 265.02 (8). Both are class “D” violent felonies in New York and are therefore punishable by a definite sentence of up to seven years in prison. A person charged under this section could get a sentence of Probation in lieu of a state prison sentence if the judge thought it was appropriate. In other words, prison is not mandatory.

NEW YORK’s ASSAULT WEAPON BAN – Part II

August 15, 2011 | Jasmine Hernandez

In Part I in our series of blogs covering New York’s so called “assault weapon” ban we began to highlight some of the most troubling parts of a ban on certain weapons based purely on cosmetic features. At Tilem & Campbell we handle a large number of gun and weapons cases and so are in a unique position to see how some of these laws are applied. We continue with other troubling provisions of New York’s assault weapon ban.

One of the most troubling features of the ban is the ban on flash suppressors. The fact is that there are many devices that attach to the barrel of a rifle and which look alike. There is no definition in the New York Penal sec 265.00 of a flash suppressor. Prior to 2004 when the Federal Assault Weapon ban expired the Federal Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) was responsible for characterizing the various devices that can be attached to the barrel of a gun. Since the federal law expired the BATFE no longer will do that. So manufacturers now attach devices to the barrel of rifles that look like flash suppressors but which manufacturers classify as “muzzle brakes”. These devices look like flash suppressors but are seemingly legal under New York law since the law specifically bans flash suppressors. The problem is that New York does not provide any definition of flash suppressor (or muzzle brake) and the difference can mean the difference between not committing any criminal offense and doing 15 years.

In addition, to the ban on firearms containing certain random cosmetic features, the Federal Assault Weapon Ban also banned detachable magazines that held more than 10 rounds. The ban on detachable magazines similarly expired under Federal Law but still exists in some states. For example New York has a ban on magazines that can hold more than 10 rounds and New Jersey has a ban on magazines that can hold more than 15 rounds. (Since these numbers were selected at random there is no uniformity among the various states that imposed their own ban.)

NEW YORK ASSAULT WEAPON BAN ALIVE AND WELL – PART I

August 12, 2011 | Jasmine Hernandez

The Assault Weapon Ban which was passed as both a federal law and State law in many jurisdictions after a swell of media hysteria and which has since elapsed as a Federal ban is still alive and well in New York and New Jersey and a recent amendment to New York law has left a dangerous trap for innocent New Yorkers. Peter Tilem, the senior partner at Tilem & Campbell and former firearms trafficking prosecutor in the City of New York has dealt with a number of these cases as both a prosecutor and a defense attorney.

The Federal Assault Weapon Ban which was passed as a 10 year ban on “Assault Weapons” expired in 2004 after it was found to be absolutely useless. The original ban which is still in effect in New York banned rifles purely based upon cosmetic features. Since automatic weapons were already illegal, the so called assault weapon ban prohibited semi-automatic weapons that had two or more cosmetic features that were deemed to make them “Assault Weapons” the list of cosmetic features includes: a pistol grip, folding or collapsible stock, bayonet lug, flash suppressor and believe it or not if it was a pistol, the weight of the pistol. If the pistol weighed more than 50 ounces that was one of the two features that would make it an “Assault Weapon”. (Up until the hysteria surrounding the Assault Weapon Ban we were told that it was the small easily concealable pistols the should be banned.) In addition, certain guns were banned by name.

It should be noted that in New York but not New Jersey if you possessed one of these guns prior to September 14, 1994 you could continue to own the so called assault weapon. This provision made the law largely unenforceable since the prosecutor could not prove, if the gun was manufactured before September 14, 1994 when it was first possessed.

NEW YORK STATE PISTOL LICENSING – PRIOR REVOCATION FOR LACK OF NECESSARY CHARACTER DOES NOT BAR SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION. ONLY REVOCATIONS PURSUANT TO CPL § 530.14 or FAM. CT. ACT § 894-a BAR SUBSEQUENT APPLICATIONS. Matter of Romanoff v. Kelly, 23 A.

August 8, 2011 | Tilem & Associates

Eligibility requirements for the issuance of a pistol license in New York are set forth in Penal Law §400.00(1). Briefly, an applicant must (1) be twenty-one years of age; (2) of good moral character; (3) have not been convicted of a felony or serious offense; (4) state whether he has ever suffered from mental illness or been confined to an institution for mental illness; and (5) not had a pistol license revoked or who is not under a suspension or ineligibility order issued pursuant to CPL 530.14 or Fam. Ct. Act 894-a.

The issue is; does a failure to satisfy any of the above eligibility requirements act as a permanent bar to licensure? The question must be answered in the negative. Peter Tilem, a partner with Tilem & Campbell, is currently challenging a Westchester County Licensing Officer’s denial of an application because the applicant had a prior revocation based upon a lack of necessary character and judgment. The Licensing Officer denied the application solely because the applicant had a prior revocation without regard for the basis of that revocation.

The licensing officer that originally revoked the applicant’s license had found that he lacked the character and judgment to possess a pistol license. The revocation was not related to an order of protection and was not made pursuant to CPL §530.14 or Fam. Ct. Act §842-a but instead was made pursuant to Penal Law 400.00(11) for a lack of character. This is important because only revocations pursuant to CPL §530.14 or Fam. Ct. Act §842-a can act as a permanent bar. However, revocations based upon a lack of character and judgment are not permanent bars to re-licensure.

SECOND DEGREE AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT – SPEECH HAS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

July 27, 2011 | Jasmine Hernandez

Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree defined under New York Penal Law 240.30, makes it a class “A” misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail to basically cause a communication to occur with another person by mail or telephone or other electronic means in a manner likely to cause to alarm or annoyance if that communication is made with the intent to annoy, harass, alarm or threaten a person. When the New York State Legislature talks about communication what they are really talking about is speech. New York State is attempting to regulate what you say and that is problematic in light of our Constitution’s First Amendment protection of speech; even unpopular or disagreeable speech.

In a decision issued earlier this week and has huge implications for New York criminal defense lawyers, Judge Valerie Alexander ruled that Penal Law sections 240.30 (1) and (2) were unconstitutional in that they were vague and over broad. She ruled that this Aggravated Harassment statute is analogous to one found unconstitutional by New York’s highest Court in 1989 and that Federal decisions have agreed that the statute is unconstitutional.

Penal Law section 240.30 clearly attempts to punish particular speech. The issue of what speech may be regulated by law in light of the Constitutional protections associated with speech has been the subject of numerous United States Supreme Court decisions. While not an absolute right (for example in might be permissible top punish someone for yelling fire in a crowded theater), freedom of speech is a fundamental right worthy of substantial protection. The New York State legislature made no attempt to distinguish in the statute between protected speech and unprotected speech or define a line that may not be crossed. Rather New York attempted to punish all speech that was annoying or alarming. Clearly, that is unconstitutional. The judge indicated that a criminal prohibition against communicating in an alarming or annoying way is by its nature facially unconstitutional.