NARCOTICS Category Archives — Page 7 of 7 — New York Criminal Attorney Blog Published by White Plains, New York Criminal Defense Lawyers

TILEM & CAMPBELL APPEALS DISTRICT COURT’S FINDING THAT THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES (21 USC 841) FOR COCAINE BASE (“CRACK”) OFFENSES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.

January 2, 2009 | Tilem & Associates

At Tilem & Campbell, we represent a wide variety of defendants charged with anything from traffic infractions to serious felonies including controlled substance offenses. In a recent federal case, we represented a defendant charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with four drug offenses involving a total of approximately 112 grams of crack cocaine. Three of the offenses were Class A felonies which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years with a maximum of life imprisonment. Due to a prior drug felony, however, had the defendant gone to trial and lost, he would have been facing 20 years to life. The remaining offense was a Class B felony which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years with a maximum of 40 years imprisonment.

Senior Partner, Peter Tilem, a former Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney’s Office (Manhattan) was defendant’s lead attorney and successfully negotiated a plea bargain pursuant to which the defendant would plead guilty as charged. In return the Government would not seek the 20 year mandatory minimum but instead would recommend the 10 year mandatory minimum. The plea agreement did not require that the defendant waive his right to appeal his sentence.

The imprisonment range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as calculated in the Pre-sentence Investigation Report was 78-97 months based upon a base offense level of 27. However, due to the statutory mandatory 10 year minimum term of imprisonment found in 21 U.S.C 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) for offenses involving crack cocaine, the defendant’s minimum term imprisonment increased to 120 months pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1(b).

This sentencing range was substantially higher than it would have been had the offenses involved powder cocaine because the Guidelines as well as the relevant statute (21 U.S.C 841) treat one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine. For example, had defendant been sentenced for a powder cocaine offense involving the same quantities, he would have been facing a sentencing range of 15-21 months.

KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES DID NOT STRIKE DOWN THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR CRACK OFFENSES. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES (21 USC 841) FOR CRACK COCAINE OFFENSES ARE ALIVE AND WELL – FOR NOW

December 30, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

At Tilem & Campbell, we often consult with and are retained by those facing or serving 5, 10 or 20 year federal statutory mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine base (crack) offenses. Many individuals mistakenly believe that the United States Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Kimbrough v United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 struck down the statutory mandatory minimums for crack offenses. The decision did no such thing and has been widely misinterpreted as having struck down the federal statutory mandatory minimums for crack offenses as well as the 100:1 powder cocaine to crack cocaine ratio. In fact the Kimbrough case concerned a Booker issue – not a statutory mandatory minimum challenge. The Kimbrough decision held that the 100:1 ratio found in the United States Sentencing Guidelines is merely advisory; as are all of the Guidelines after Booker.

The Kimbrough decision held that a sentencing court may consider the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity found in the Guidelines when determining a sentence. In Kimbrough, the defendant’s Guideline range was well above the statutory mandatory minimum. What the District Court did was consider the 100:1 ratio and its effect on the sentencing range. Based upon that consideration, the District Court, decided that the ratio resulted in an overly excessive sentencing range and sentenced the defendant to a sentence below the advisory sentence as calculated under the Guidelines – but above the 10 year statutory mandatory minimum.

However, the reasoning and discussion in Kimbrough established that the United States Supreme Court has now acknowledged that the fears that one time supported the 100:1 crack/powder sentencing disparity have proved unfounded and that crack cocaine and powder cocaine are the same drug and bring about the same physiological effects of the user. The decision also cited numerous Commission reports critical of the ratio and urging its abolishment.

THE FEDERAL 100:1 POWDER COCAINE/CRACK COCAINE RATIO AND THE RESULTING DISPARITY IN FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING FOR COCAINE OFFENSES?

December 27, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

Recently, Tilem & Campbell filed an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the federal statutory mandatory minimum sentences applicable to crack cocaine offenses and the 100:1 powder cocaine vs. crack cocaine ratio. The issues raised in the appeal will be discussed in future blogs as will the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kimbrough v United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).

However, one must have a basic understanding of the federal statutory mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and how they apply to both powder cocaine and crack cocaine to understand the arguments against them as well as the Kimbrough decision. Germane to this discussion is an understanding of the often discussed 100:1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine ratio. It is this ratio that has resulted in crack offenders spending decades in prison while powder cocaine offenders convicted of offenses involving the same weight often spend less than two years in prison.

Basically, for sentencing purposes in the federal system, the relevant statute (21 U.S.C 841) treats one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine. For example, possession of just 5 grams of crack cocaine (about a thimble full) triggers a five year mandatory minimum sentence. However, it would take 500 grams of powder cocaine (1/2 kilo) to trigger the same mandatory minimum. (See 21 USC 841). Therefore, one who possesses what is clearly a personal use amount of crack cocaine (5 grams) faces the same sentence as a major dealer of powder cocaine.

NEW YORK’s VEHICLE PRESUMPTION – NEW YORK DRUG AND NARCOTICS CASES – Marijuana Not Included Part II

December 20, 2008 | Jasmine Hernandez

As discussed in the previous blog, under certain circumstances, all occupants of a vehicle can be presumed to possess drugs, guns or other weapons found within the vehicle. We also discussed the effect of the presumption on the New York criminal case and went into some detail about the presumption as it applies to New york gun cases and New York Weapon cases.

Now we discuss the vehicle presumption as it applies to New York controlled substance cases. With certain drug possession offenses carrying a mandatory minimum of eight years, the stakes are very high when traveling in a vehicle with someone who may possess illegal drugs. Similar to the gun presumption, New York’s drug presumption applies to all vehicles except public buses (it applies in stolen vehicles unlike the gun presumption). According to a strict reading of the statute, the drug presumption applies to all persons in the vehicle at the time the drugs are found. Since generally the police take all of the occupants out of the vehicle, I would argue that in such a case the presumption does not apply.

Like the gun presumption, the drug presumption does not apply in three circumstances. The presumption does not apply to a cab driver or livery cab driver. It does not apply if a person in the vehicle is authorized to possess the controlled substance (has a prescription for the drug) and the drug is in the same packaging as when he received it. The presumption also does not apply when the drugs are found on the person of one of the occupants.

NEW YORK’s VEHICLE PRESUMPTION – KNOW WHO YOU’RE IN THE CAR WITH (AND WHAT THEY HAVE) Part I

December 17, 2008 | Jasmine Hernandez

New York Criminal Law establishes a presumption that all people in a vehicle are presumed to possess either drugs or guns that are found within the vehicle. What that means is that in New York each and every person inside a car will generally be charged with gun possession or drug possession for contraband that is found anywhere in that car, regardless of where the drugs or guns are found. (With certain exceptions, some of which are discussed below.)

NEW YORK GUN POSSESSION PRESUMPTION

In the case of gun, with possession of a loaded gun in New York carrying a mandatory minimum of three and one half years in prison, you are taking a tremendous chance driving with someone who may have an illegal gun. The New York gun presumption applies to all vehicles except stolen vehicles and public buses and applies not only to firearms but other weapons. The presumption has three major exceptions. The presumption does not apply if the weapon is recovered on the person of one of the occupants of the vehicle. It does not apply to the driver of a cab or livery cab and the presumption does not apply if one of the occupants has a license to carry the weapon concealed.

NEW YORK CRIMINAL DEFENSE FIRM CHALLENGES MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES IN FEDERAL CRACK CASES

October 1, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell has filed Court papers seeking to prevent the use of mandatory minimum sentences in federal crack cases. Citing the reasoning in the recent Supreme Court decision, Kimbrough v United States that permitted Federal District Courts to consider the “100-1” ratio when considering whether or not to sentence below the federal sentencing guidelines in crack (or cocaine base) cases, Tilem & Campbell asked the Courts to take the ruling one step further and declare the mandatory minimums unconstitutional. The “100-1” ratio refers to the fact that under the current federal sentencing scheme, an offender sentenced for cocaine base is likely to get roughly the same sentence as a person sentences for 100 times as much cocaine.

The Supreme Court in Kimbrough found that this “100 -1” ratio was unwarranted based upon the fact that cocaine base (crack) and cocaine are two forms of the same drug with the same active ingredient and the same physiological and psychotropic effects. In addition, citing statistics from the United States Sentencing Commission, the Supreme Court indicated that there was a racial disparity with minorities and in particular African-Americans receiving longer sentences for crack offenses than their white counterparts who were committing cocaine offenses.

Tilem & Campbell filed the challenges in both the US District Court for the Southern District of New York and the US District Court for the Eastern District Court and decisions are awaited from both Courts.

CHANGES IN FEDERAL CRACK SENTENCING

April 20, 2008 | Jasmine Hernandez

The issue of crack cocaine sentences in federal cases is one that has bothered experienced federal criminal defense attorneys, especially in New York, for some time. Unlike the New York State Court System, where crack is treated the same as cocaine*, in the federal criminal system, individuals charged with crack face the same amount of time as a person who possesses or sells 100 times the amount of cocaine. That is to say, that the sentence for 5 grams of crack (about the amount of tow sugar cubes) and 500 grams of cocaine (half of a kilo) will be approximately the same, all other factors being equal.

This disparity has led to claims of discrimination. In 2006, 82 percent of federal defendants who were sentenced for selling crack were African-American. Even the United States Sentencing Commission seems to agree having reduced crack cases by 2 points on the federal sentencing guidelines and made the reduction retroactive.

In addition, the United States Supreme Court seems to be stepping into the mix. In Kimbrough, a case decided recently in the Supreme Court, the High Court decided that a federal judge may consider the crack-cocaine discrepancy in sentencing someone below the range set by the federal sentencing guidelines.