Articles Posted in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Recently I was contacted by a person who had been issued a ticket for passing a stopped school bus (VTL 1174 “Overtaking And Passing School Bus) by a New Rochelle Police Officer who left the ticket with this person’s son at the front door of his home located in White Plains, New York. Briefly, this gentleman’s front doorbell rang. His nineteen year old son answered the door and was greeted by a New Rochelle Police Officer who asked him if he was the owner of a particular vehicle that was parked in his driveway. The son said he wasn’t but that his dad was at which point the New Rochelle Police Officer handed the son a traffic ticket for his father for passing a stopped school bus (VTL 1174).

I later learned that the New Rochelle Police Officer had not witnessed the alleged improper passing of the school bus nor had any other police officers. However, a school bus driver had written down the license plate number of a vehicle the school bus driver alleged had failed to stop for the school bus which had stopped, activated its lights and stop-sign and was discharging school children. The school bus driver then contacted the police, told them what he witnessed and gave them the plate number.

The police ran the plate number and learned the make, model, year and color of the vehicle and who it was registered to. The make, model, year and color matched the description given by the school bus driver. That’s what led the New Rochelle Police to this person’s home in White Plains, NY. However, the police cannot issue a traffic ticket to a person by leaving it with someone else.

In New York, as elsewhere, probationary sentences for criminal charges play a major role in the criminal justice system. Incarceration is rarely appropriate. When a judge sentences a defendant to a sentence that involves probation, it is the judge that determines the conditions of such probation. By law, it is the judge who determines a sentence and the conditions of that sentence. The sentencing judge cannot delegate his or her sentencing authority by allowing the Department of Probation to determine a defendant’s probation conditions. It is improper for sentencing judge to simply tell a defendant at sentencing that the Department of Probation will determine the defendant’s probation conditions. Such a blanket delegation of total discretion to the department of probation without any court-imposed parameters and guidance is improper.

“Sentenc[ing] is primarily a judicial responsibility.” People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 240 (1974). The granting of probation is a judicial process exercised in the discretion of the sentencing court. People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113 (1953). When a defendant is sentenced to probation, the Court, not the probation department, sets the terms and conditions of probation. PL § 65.10(1).

New York Criminal Procedure Law § 410.10(1) provides in part, “When the court pronounces a sentence of probation . . . it must specify as part of the sentence the conditions to be complied with.” This duty of the court to specify probation conditions cannot be delegated to the probation department or to any other party. See People v. Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152 (1982)(“Although a sentencing court may utilize the Probation Department “to act as a preliminary fact finder and submit its recommendations in a written report . . . in the end it is for the court, which alone must impose the sentence, to decide how much of the report, if any, to adopt and how much to reject”).

With Limited Exceptions, When the Defendant is a Natural Person,
Appearance Tickets Must be Served Personally [CPL 150.40(2)]

Generally, under New York law, other than an appearance ticket issued for a traffic infraction relating to parking, an appearance ticket must be personally served. Except, an appearance ticket issued for the violation of a local zoning ordinance or local zoning law, or of a local building or sanitation code may be issued in any manner authorized for service in a civil action under CPLR 308. CPL 150.40(2).

To summarize, appearance tickets issued to natural persons in New York must be personally served. Except, appearance tickets may be served in accordance with CPLR 308 (see below section) if they are for parking violations or violations of local zoning, building or sanitation violations.

Service Upon a Natural Person by Mail Insufficient. New York City Routinely Ignores The Requirement That Appearance Tickets Issued To Natural Persons Be Personally Served.

Personal service on a “defendant, whose liberty will be at stake in a criminal action, serves to assure his right to adequate notice and expeditious resolution of the charges.” People v. DiLorenzo, 149 Misc.2d 791, 794 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990). In DiLorenzo, the court noted that the certified mailing of an appearance ticket that should have been personally served was insufficient service.

In People v. Baxter, 148 Misc.2d 1009 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990) the court found service of appearance tickets by a New York City administrative agency by mail defective and dismissed charges for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the court observed “that the CPL requirements of personal service are not being followed by the Buildings Department and other administrative agencies.” Id. at 1010.

In People v. Neuberger, 149 Misc.2d 1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) the court dismissed all charges against the defendants in the interests of justice explaining that “[a]s for the Corporation Counsel’s continued practice of flouting the service requirements of the Criminal Procedure Law, that abuse cannot be left unremedied.” People v. Neuberger, 149 Misc. 2d 1, 5 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1991).

In Neuberger, several defendants were served appearance tickets by mail which ordered them to appear in criminal court. The Honorable Martin G. Karopkin explained that the Corporation Counsel had been warned numerous times over the preceding several months that such service by mail was improper:

On numerous occasions during the past several months this court, and others, have warned the Office of the Corporation Counsel, the Buildings Department and other city agencies that service by mail is improper and contrary to CPL 150.40, as well as CPL 600.10

.

Id. at 1-2.

Despite the repeated warnings of both J. Karopkin and other judges, “the Corporation Counsel . . . continued to submit affidavits of mailing to the court accompanying its pleadings and to argue that the defendants’ appearances confer jurisdiction and render that issue moot.” Id. at 2-3.

In other words, the New York City Corporation Counsel knowingly served appearance tickets on individuals by mail, in clear contravention of the law. What’s more troubling is that they continued to do so even after several judges warned the Corporation Counsel that such service was improper. Thus, the Corporation Counsel “acquired these defendants’ presence by means of improper service” and then argued that the defendants’ mere presence before the court conferred jurisdiction thus mooting the service issue. Id. at 5.

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In New York, where a police officer has arrested a person but has decided to issue that person an appearance ticket instead of bringing that person before a judge, the arrested person may be required to post pre-arraignment bail. The bail is forfeited if the person fails to appear as instructed in the appearance ticket. [CPL 150.30(1)].

Pre-arraignment bail (sometimes referred to as “stationhouse” bail) is fixed by the desk officer in charge at any police station/headquarters or the county jail or any of the desk officer’s superior officers as follows:

• For an E felony – up to $750.00;

If the police crash through your front-door at 6:00 a.m. in full paramilitary ninja outfits like Seal Team 6; drag you out of bed with assault weapons jammed in your temple; handcuff you and then proceed to tear up your house before realizing you live at 639 Main Street and the warrant is for 693 Main Street, you are most likely in custody. You couldn’t just get up and head out for your morning jog. However, if the police simply want to serve you with an appearance ticket at your home for leaving the scene of an accident or some other traffic infraction mystery they diligently investigated; you would not be in custody when they show up in the same paramilitary ninja outfits.

It does not constitute an arrest where the police decide to issue an appearance ticket to a person in a situation that does not require them to stop and seize that person. For example, in Angel v. Kasson, 581 F Supp 170 (N.D.N.Y 1983) after conducting an investigation into the death of an infant, the police decided to charge the parents with Endangering the Welfare of a Child. Id. at 174.

However, instead of formally arresting the parents, the police traveled to their home and served them with appearance tickets directing them to appear in court on a specific date to answer charges of endangering the welfare of a child. Id. The parents weren’t stopped while walking on the street or driving their car, detained and searched.

If you’re stopped by the police in New York (Greenburgh, White Plains, Harrison, etc) for a traffic infraction such as speeding, should the police read you your “rights” prior to questioning you about where you coming from, if you had anything to drink or if you knew why you were stopped? When a person is arrested they lose certain rights. For example, when one is arrested, they lose their right to liberty and they are subject to a warrantless search incident to their arrest. In fact, a search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the many exceptions to the search warrant requirement.

However, while a person loses certain rights when they are arrested, they also obtain certain rights once they are arrested. For example, before the police can question a person who has been arrested they must read that person their “rights” – the police must “Mirandize” an arrested person before questioning.

There is absolutely no doubt that Uniform Traffic Tickets or Simplified Traffic Informations are also appearance tickets. See e.g., People v. Tyler, 1 N.Y.3d 493 (2004)(speeding ticket deemed an appearance ticket); People v. Hollinger, 15 Misc. 3d 130A (App. Term 2nd Dept. 2007)(The front of the uniform traffic tickets directed defendant to appear in the Justice Court of the Village of Old Westbury on September 18, 2003, thus serving as an “appearance ticket” under CPL 150.10); Farkas v. State, 96 Misc. 2d 784, 787 fn 1 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978)(Appearance ticket includes, by definition, uniform traffic tickets); People v. Litean, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5475, 240 N.Y.L.J. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)(“A summons requiring a defendant to appear in court is the equivalent of a desk appearance ticket . . .”); People v. Genovese, 156 Misc. 2d 569, 571 (J. Ct. 1992)(“the yellow copy of the simplified traffic information is an appearance ticket as defined by CPL 150.10”).

Since People v. Hazelwood, 104 Misc.2d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1980) held that the detention of a person by the police for the purpose of issuing such person an appearance ticket creates an “arrest situation” justifying a search of such person just as if they had been formally arrested, doesn’t it follow that the police would have to Mirandize this so-called “arrested” person before questioning them? Why should the police get the benefit of deeming the person “arrested” so they can search them but not allow this “arrested” person the benefit of his Miranda rights just like any other arrested person?

One stopped by the police is clearly not free to go. In People v. Wallgren, 2011 NY Slip Op 51556U, (N.Y. County Ct. Aug. 16, 2011) the police officers testified at the probable cause hearing that defendant’s vehicle was driving erratically and they stopped it only to check on the driver’s “welfare.” However, as observed by the court, the officers were not concerned about the driver’s welfare but instead immediately launched into a DWI investigation:
Notwithstanding both officers’ testimony regarding the welfare
check, Officer Einsfeld, upon approaching the driver’s window,
asked whether the defendant was drinking prior to driving, where
the defendant came from and where the defendant was going.
These questions were clearly indicative of a DWI investigation,
not a welfare check and are designed to solicit incriminating
evidence from a motorist.

Furthermore, the police admitted that “when a police officer activates the police lights, the person is supposed to stop and is not free to leave until the police speak with the person.” Id. The court therefore concluded that the police testimony established that the defendant was in custody from the very inception of the defendant’s encounter with the police: “By [Officer Einsfeld’s] testimony alone the custodial status of the defendant from the very inception was admitted by the police.” Id.

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Senior Partner Peter H. Tilem of the White Plains law firm, Tilem & Campbell recently passed the test to become an NRA Certified Pistol Instructor. Mr. Tilem, who is a senior criminal defense lawyer, NRA member and handles much of the firms firearms law practice together with law partner Peter Tilem, was an experienced and avid firearms enthusiast before passing the National Rifle Association’s instructors’ test.Besides being a lifelong shooter, Mr. Tilem has been handling gun and weapons cases for decades. Initially, as a prosecutor, in one of the most anti-gun counties, in one of the most anti-gun states in the United States, Mr. Tilem handled the prosecution of countless gun and knife cases as well as cases involving a variety of other weapons. After several years as a prosecutor, Mr. Tilem was asked to join the District Attorney’s Office’s Firearms Trafficking Unit where he handled large scale, gun trafficking conspiracy cases in addition to other gun cases and violent crimes and became an adviser to other prosecutors in the handling of gun cases.

After leaving the District Attorney’s Office and entering private practice, Mr. Tilem put his experience and knowledge of New York gun laws to work helping law-abiding citizens who got caught in the web of New York’s criminal justice system which treats law-abiding citizens with firearms (or knives) as criminals. In New York, a law abiding citizen who carries his (or her) pistol into New York with an out-of-state permit (ccw) faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 and 1/2 years in prison. In addition, New York still has on the books the functional equivalent of the since repealed Federal Assault Weapons ban which punishes as a felony possession of rifles or shotguns that have cosmetic features that are deemed to look offensive. The outdated and ill conceived assault weapon ban in New York is so poorly written and hard to understand that neither the police, prosecutors nor civilians can be sure of what is felonious conduct and what is perfectly legal.

In addition to New York’s bizarre gun laws, New York bans virtually any weapon imaginable including brass knuckles, billy clubs, “sand bag[s]” (whatever that means), wrist-brace type sling shots, nun-chucks and kung fu stars just to give some examples. As Mr. Tilem has written about extensively, New York’s ban on knives is so complete that it seems to ban steak knives in restaurants (at least in the five boroughs of New York City) and virtually any lock blade folding knife as a “gravity knife.”

Recently we reported in our blog that a DWI conviction was vacated on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where the lawyer simply had his client plead guilty to Driving While Intoxicated without conducting an investigation into the evidence in the case. Now, just last week, the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction where a defense attorney neglected to tell the defendant about a plea offer and the defendant was later sentenced to a much more lengthy prison sentence than he would have gotten if he accepted the plea deal.

In the case of Missouri v. Frye the United States Supreme Court for the first time recognized that the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that a defendant’s right to effective representation extends to the plea bargain process and that if the lawyer is ineffective during the plea bargain process, the defendant may be entitled to reversal of his conviction.

In the Frye case, Galin Frye was accused of driving with a revoked license. Since he had been convicted of this same offense three times in the past he was facing a felony charge which carries up to 4 years in prison. During the pendency of the case, the prosecutor told Frye’s lawyer that Frye could plead guilty to a misdemeanor and receive a sentence of 90 days. Frye’s lawyer never conveyed that offer to him and he subsequently plead guilty and received three years in prison. On appeal Galin Frye argued that that we was denied his right to counsel because of ineffective of assistance of counsel. His conviction was reversed.

Have you been charged in New York with “speed not prudent” by an officer who did not witness the alleged offense? Were you involved in an accident and then issued a ticket for an infraction by an officer who did not witness the accident? Judge Malone of the Justice Court of Mendon, New York, noted in People v. Genovese, that the practice whereby police officers in New York issue tickets for traffic infractions they did not witness occurs every day in lower courts across the State.

One of the most common scenarios is where an officer arrives upon the scene of an accident he did not witness and, after conducting an “investigation”, concludes that one of the drivers (or the only driver if it was a single car accident) had to be driving at a speed not reasonable and prudent and issues a traffic ticket to the “offending” driver charging him or her with violating VTL 1180(a) – “Speed Not Prudent” – which states that:

No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual
and potential hazards then existing
.

This practice is wholly improper. First, as detailed above, a police officer cannot issue an appearance ticket for a traffic infraction not committed in his presence. Second, “[t]he mere happening of the accident because of the skidding of [driver’s car] did not warrant the conclusion that there had been negligent operation of a motor vehicle or that the statute had been violated.” Weisinger v. MacDuff, 285 A.D. 607, 611 (1st Dept. 1955). To be guilty of driving faster than is reasonable and prudent, the conduct of the driver must constitute more than mere error of judgment or simple negligence. People v. Benway, 41 Misc.2d 39 (1963) see also Hessney v. MacDuff, 284 A.D. 70, 72 (4th Dept. 1954)(Negligent operation of a motor vehicle may not be inferred merely because a car skidded or an accident happened); Fake v. MacDuff, 281 A.D. 630, 633 (4th Dept. 1953)(The fact that the car skidded or slid off the road does not, standing alone, even constitute ordinary negligence).

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In New York, a court cannot change, amend or otherwise alter a sentence in a criminal case without the defendant and his or her criminal defense attorney being present. Occasionally a court might attempt to change an otherwise legal sentence post sentence by signing additional probation conditions. This practice is contrary to both statutory and decisional law. The New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that “[t]he defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.” CPL 380.40(1). It is axiomatic that a defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to be present at the time of sentencing. People v. Brown, 155 A.D.2d 608 (2nd Dept. 1989)(CPL 380.40(1) requires a defendant to be present at the time of sentence); People v. Lucks, 91 A.D.2d 896 at 897, 457 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1st Dept. 1983)(“CPL 380.40 (subd 1) is clear in its direction that a defendant be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”)

More importantly however, is the long-standing, clearly established, rule of law, that a court has no authority to alter a sentence in the absence of the defendant and his attorney. People v. Saperstein, 1 A.D.2d 949, 150 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1st Dept. 1956). A court’s failure to have a defendant produced at a proceeding at which the defendant’s sentence is amended, violates that defendant’s statutory right to be present at the time of sentencing. People v. Garrison, 9 A.D.3d 436, 780 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2nd Dept. 2004); see also People ex rel. Walker v. Wilkins, 23 A.D.2d 619, 256 N.Y.S.2d 810 (4th Dept. 1965)(Change of sentence out of presence of defendant and his attorney ruled invalid).

Not only must the defendant be present for all sentencing proceedings, his or her attorney must also be present. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI. Similarly, the New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . .” NY Const. Art I, § 6.

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