CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Category Archives — Page 21 of 23 — New York Criminal Attorney Blog Published by White Plains, New York Criminal Defense Lawyers

THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR CRACK COCAINE OFFENSES (21 USC 841) ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON SEVERAL GROUNDS.

January 7, 2009 | Tilem & Associates

As I indicated in prior blogs, Tilem & Campbell is currently challenging the constitutionality of the federal mandatory minimum sentences for federal crack cocaine offenses. We currently have an appeal pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and will be filing another shortly on behalf of an African-American appellant.

Our current appeal concerns an Hispanic defendant sentenced to the 10 year mandatory minimum for four federal felonies involving approximately 112 grams of crack cocaine (21 USC 841). We challenged the constitutionality of the 10 year mandatory minimum sentence on three grounds. Briefly, we argued that depriving the defendant of his liberty, a fundamental right, longer than one convicted of a powder cocaine offense involving the same weight violates his equal protection rights under both strict scrutiny and rational basis review.

We also argued that the 100:1 ratio and corresponding grossly disproportionate sentences imposed upon minorities for crack offenses compared to those sentences imposed upon the mostly white offenders convicted of powder cocaine offenses involving the same weight violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment Equal Protection rights (note, the Equal Protection rights found in the Fifth Amendment apply to the Federal Government while the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States).

TILEM & CAMPBELL APPEALS DISTRICT COURT’S FINDING THAT THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES (21 USC 841) FOR COCAINE BASE (“CRACK”) OFFENSES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.

January 2, 2009 | Tilem & Associates

At Tilem & Campbell, we represent a wide variety of defendants charged with anything from traffic infractions to serious felonies including controlled substance offenses. In a recent federal case, we represented a defendant charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with four drug offenses involving a total of approximately 112 grams of crack cocaine. Three of the offenses were Class A felonies which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years with a maximum of life imprisonment. Due to a prior drug felony, however, had the defendant gone to trial and lost, he would have been facing 20 years to life. The remaining offense was a Class B felony which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years with a maximum of 40 years imprisonment.

Senior Partner, Peter Tilem, a former Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney’s Office (Manhattan) was defendant’s lead attorney and successfully negotiated a plea bargain pursuant to which the defendant would plead guilty as charged. In return the Government would not seek the 20 year mandatory minimum but instead would recommend the 10 year mandatory minimum. The plea agreement did not require that the defendant waive his right to appeal his sentence.

The imprisonment range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as calculated in the Pre-sentence Investigation Report was 78-97 months based upon a base offense level of 27. However, due to the statutory mandatory 10 year minimum term of imprisonment found in 21 U.S.C 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) for offenses involving crack cocaine, the defendant’s minimum term imprisonment increased to 120 months pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1(b).

This sentencing range was substantially higher than it would have been had the offenses involved powder cocaine because the Guidelines as well as the relevant statute (21 U.S.C 841) treat one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine. For example, had defendant been sentenced for a powder cocaine offense involving the same quantities, he would have been facing a sentencing range of 15-21 months.

KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES DID NOT STRIKE DOWN THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR CRACK OFFENSES. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES (21 USC 841) FOR CRACK COCAINE OFFENSES ARE ALIVE AND WELL – FOR NOW

December 30, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

At Tilem & Campbell, we often consult with and are retained by those facing or serving 5, 10 or 20 year federal statutory mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine base (crack) offenses. Many individuals mistakenly believe that the United States Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Kimbrough v United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 struck down the statutory mandatory minimums for crack offenses. The decision did no such thing and has been widely misinterpreted as having struck down the federal statutory mandatory minimums for crack offenses as well as the 100:1 powder cocaine to crack cocaine ratio. In fact the Kimbrough case concerned a Booker issue – not a statutory mandatory minimum challenge. The Kimbrough decision held that the 100:1 ratio found in the United States Sentencing Guidelines is merely advisory; as are all of the Guidelines after Booker.

The Kimbrough decision held that a sentencing court may consider the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity found in the Guidelines when determining a sentence. In Kimbrough, the defendant’s Guideline range was well above the statutory mandatory minimum. What the District Court did was consider the 100:1 ratio and its effect on the sentencing range. Based upon that consideration, the District Court, decided that the ratio resulted in an overly excessive sentencing range and sentenced the defendant to a sentence below the advisory sentence as calculated under the Guidelines – but above the 10 year statutory mandatory minimum.

However, the reasoning and discussion in Kimbrough established that the United States Supreme Court has now acknowledged that the fears that one time supported the 100:1 crack/powder sentencing disparity have proved unfounded and that crack cocaine and powder cocaine are the same drug and bring about the same physiological effects of the user. The decision also cited numerous Commission reports critical of the ratio and urging its abolishment.

THE FEDERAL 100:1 POWDER COCAINE/CRACK COCAINE RATIO AND THE RESULTING DISPARITY IN FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING FOR COCAINE OFFENSES?

December 27, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

Recently, Tilem & Campbell filed an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the federal statutory mandatory minimum sentences applicable to crack cocaine offenses and the 100:1 powder cocaine vs. crack cocaine ratio. The issues raised in the appeal will be discussed in future blogs as will the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kimbrough v United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).

However, one must have a basic understanding of the federal statutory mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and how they apply to both powder cocaine and crack cocaine to understand the arguments against them as well as the Kimbrough decision. Germane to this discussion is an understanding of the often discussed 100:1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine ratio. It is this ratio that has resulted in crack offenders spending decades in prison while powder cocaine offenders convicted of offenses involving the same weight often spend less than two years in prison.

Basically, for sentencing purposes in the federal system, the relevant statute (21 U.S.C 841) treats one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine. For example, possession of just 5 grams of crack cocaine (about a thimble full) triggers a five year mandatory minimum sentence. However, it would take 500 grams of powder cocaine (1/2 kilo) to trigger the same mandatory minimum. (See 21 USC 841). Therefore, one who possesses what is clearly a personal use amount of crack cocaine (5 grams) faces the same sentence as a major dealer of powder cocaine.

New York Times Reports Sharp Increase in Shoplifting Arrests

December 23, 2008 | Jasmine Hernandez

On the front page of today’s New York Times, the Times is reporting a sharp increase in shoplifting and shoplifting arrests across the Country. Citing several factors including the weak economy the Times is reporting that shoplifting arrests are up ten to twenty percent over last year.

At the New York criminal defense firm, Tilem & Campbell we have also seen the increase in New York shoplifting cases through telephone inquiries to the firm, cases on which the firm has been retained, and cases we see in Court. Here in White Plains, New York, home to several shopping malls, the increase is clearly visible in the cases that the White Plains Court is handling.

It is important to remember that shoplifting in New York can result in several criminal charges including Petite Larceny and Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree both class “A” misdemeanors punishable by up to one year in jail. If the property stolen retails for more than $1000 the charges can be Grand Larceny and Criminal Possession of Stolen Property In the Fourth Degree, both felonies punishable by up to four years in prison.

NEW YORK’s VEHICLE PRESUMPTION – NEW YORK DRUG AND NARCOTICS CASES – Marijuana Not Included Part II

December 20, 2008 | Jasmine Hernandez

As discussed in the previous blog, under certain circumstances, all occupants of a vehicle can be presumed to possess drugs, guns or other weapons found within the vehicle. We also discussed the effect of the presumption on the New York criminal case and went into some detail about the presumption as it applies to New york gun cases and New York Weapon cases.

Now we discuss the vehicle presumption as it applies to New York controlled substance cases. With certain drug possession offenses carrying a mandatory minimum of eight years, the stakes are very high when traveling in a vehicle with someone who may possess illegal drugs. Similar to the gun presumption, New York’s drug presumption applies to all vehicles except public buses (it applies in stolen vehicles unlike the gun presumption). According to a strict reading of the statute, the drug presumption applies to all persons in the vehicle at the time the drugs are found. Since generally the police take all of the occupants out of the vehicle, I would argue that in such a case the presumption does not apply.

Like the gun presumption, the drug presumption does not apply in three circumstances. The presumption does not apply to a cab driver or livery cab driver. It does not apply if a person in the vehicle is authorized to possess the controlled substance (has a prescription for the drug) and the drug is in the same packaging as when he received it. The presumption also does not apply when the drugs are found on the person of one of the occupants.

NEW YORK’s VEHICLE PRESUMPTION – KNOW WHO YOU’RE IN THE CAR WITH (AND WHAT THEY HAVE) Part I

December 17, 2008 | Jasmine Hernandez

New York Criminal Law establishes a presumption that all people in a vehicle are presumed to possess either drugs or guns that are found within the vehicle. What that means is that in New York each and every person inside a car will generally be charged with gun possession or drug possession for contraband that is found anywhere in that car, regardless of where the drugs or guns are found. (With certain exceptions, some of which are discussed below.)

NEW YORK GUN POSSESSION PRESUMPTION

In the case of gun, with possession of a loaded gun in New York carrying a mandatory minimum of three and one half years in prison, you are taking a tremendous chance driving with someone who may have an illegal gun. The New York gun presumption applies to all vehicles except stolen vehicles and public buses and applies not only to firearms but other weapons. The presumption has three major exceptions. The presumption does not apply if the weapon is recovered on the person of one of the occupants of the vehicle. It does not apply to the driver of a cab or livery cab and the presumption does not apply if one of the occupants has a license to carry the weapon concealed.

New Tork Traffic Ticket Lawyers Tilem & Campbell Announce New Web Page

October 8, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

New York Traffic Ticket Lawyers, Tilem & Campbell are please to announce the posting of their newest web paging entitled “New York City Traffic Tickets“. The page is designed to be a primer of the practices of the New York Traffic Violation Bureau Courts (TVB) that operate in New York City, Rochester, Buffalo and parts of Suffolk County. If you receive a traffic summons in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens, Manhattan or Staten Island in New York City it will be returnable to the Department of Motor Vehicles and be adjudicated in a TVB. The New York City Traffic Ticket page will educate you about the practices and procedures of these administrative courts.

The page is broken up by heading with topics such as “The Hearing”, “Entering Your Plea” and “The Rules of Evidence at the Hearing” and more and therefore should be a simple reference for any questions realting to New York City Traffic Tickets.

If you receive a traffic summons in the City of New York or any other area that is covered by the TVB please refer to the “New York City Traffic Tickets” page or contact us at 877-DR SUMMONS. Keep in mind that the TVB only handles traffic infractions and not traffic misdemeanors or other types of violations.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IN A NEW YORK TRAFFIC VIOLATION CASE

September 10, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

In a previous blog I explained that one doesn’t not have a statutory right to a speedy trial in a New York traffic violation case (such as speeding, red light, stop signs violations, etc). Does this mean that a New York court can take years to schedule your trial? The answer is yes and no. While there is no statutory right to a speedy trial in a traffic violation case, the courts have held that one charged with a New York traffic violation has a constitutional right to have his or her trial held within two years. This constitutional right is found in CPL § 30.20 which basically states that after a criminal prosecution is commenced the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial. This section does not set forth what constitutes a speedy trial however. It also applies to traffic violations because for purposes of procedure, traffic violations are treated as misdemeanors. See VTL § 155. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution also guarantees a right to a speedy trial even in traffic violation cases.

Numerous New York court cases have held that the speedy trial provision found in CPL § 30.20 applies to traffic violation cases. The question becomes therefore, what is considered an acceptable time frame within which one charged with a New York traffic violation must be brought to trial in light of CPL § 30.20? Two years seems to be the limit provided the delay is not caused by the defendant. Below are reviews of relevant cases:

In People v. Thorpe, 160 Misc.2d 558, 613 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1994) the Appellate Term dismissed a conviction due to an unexplained two year delay in bringing the case to trial. This is the case to rely on when making a speedy trial motion. See also People v. Matera, 2003 WL 21974065 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term), 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51180(U)(unexplained delay of over two years in bringing traffic infraction to trial warranted dismissal); People v. Rogoish, 2003 WL 21700087 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term), 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51120(U)(unexplained delay of over three years in bringing the traffic infraction to trial warranted dismissal)

NEW YORK HAS NO STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT FOR TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS.

September 2, 2008 | Tilem & Associates

The simple fact is, a motorist charged with a New York traffic violation has no statutory right to a speedy trial. The denial of a statutory right to a speedy trial in a New York traffic violation case is yet another example of the New York Judiciary completely disregarding the laws duly enacted by the Legislature and imposing their own will. It is yet another example of what I consistently refer to as judicial supremacy as opposed to judicial oversight. Such rulings by the courts quite simply amount to a judicial hijacking of the legislative role thus destroying the separation of powers.

A review of the relevant laws reveals that the Courts’ denial of speedy trial rights in traffic violation cases (as well as the denial of other rights in traffic violation cases) is completely contrary to the clear and unambiguous wording of the laws; laws that the judiciary is constitutionally obligated to enforce and carryout whether they agree with them or not.

First of all, the New York State Legislature has determined that, with some exceptions, traffic “violations shall be deemed as misdemeanors and all provisions of law relating to misdemeanors . . . shall apply except that no jury trial shall be allowed for traffic infractions.” See VTL § 155. Therefore, if the Legislature has determined that traffic violations are to be treated procedurally as misdemeanors, under what possible theory could the speedy trial statutes not apply? See for example People v. Solomon, 1984, 124 Misc.2d 33, 475 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1984) where the court held that the right to speedy trial does not attach to actions commenced for traffic violations. See also People v. Howell, 158 Misc.2d 653, 601 N.Y.S.2d 778(1993)(Speedy trial statute applies only to felonies, misdemeanors, and violations, and “violation” is specifically defined to exclude traffic infractions.)