Articles Posted in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell is vigorously challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences for federal crack cocaine offenses set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA). We currently have one appeal on this issue pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and will be filing another appeal shortly.

The ADAA established a two-tier system of sentencing with 5 and 10 year mandatory minimum sentences for certain manufacturing and distribution offenses. Congress passed the 10 year mandatory minimum to combat “major drug dealers” while the 5 year mandatory minimum was for the “serious traffickers”. In reality, however, the mandatory minimums are weight driven. It is the weight of the drugs involved that controls with no regard for whether the defendant is a “major dealer” or “serious trafficker”.

The ADAA also established a 100-to-1 disparity between the distribution of powder cocaine and crack cocaine (21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)). For example, distributing just 5 grams of crack cocaine (about a thimble full) carries a mandatory minimum five-year federal prison sentence. However, one must distribute 500 grams of powder cocaine to trigger that same five-year federal prison sentence. (21 U.S.C. § 841).

Just 16 years after the passage of The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 which all but eliminated harsh mandatory minimums for federal drug offenses, Congress reversed course and passed The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA). The ADAA was passed by Congress during the media frenzy that followed the cocaine induced death of University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias. The ADAA established harsh mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses involving “crack” cocaine (referred to as “cocaine base” in the federal statutes).

Congressional members used Bias’ high-profile death as a political opportunity to portray a “tough on crime” stance. However, Congress utterly failed to undertake any discussion or debate about the failings of the mandatory minimums found in the The Boggs Act of 1951and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 (which I have discussed in previous blogs).

In fact, Sen. Specter noted that Congress “may be acting with undue haste” and Sen. Mathias stated that none of the members of the Senate “had an adequate opportunity to study this enormous package” and that the ADAA “did not emerge from the crucible of the committee process, tempered by the heat of debate.”

“Switchblade Knife” is defined in New York as any knife that has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device within the knife’s handle. (For the exact definition of “Switchblade Knife” see NY Penal Law § 265.00(4)).

It is an “A” Misdemeanor to possess a switchblade knife (Penal Law § 265.01(1) – Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree). However, it is not a crime to possess a switchblade knife if it is for use while fishing, hunting or trapping and you have a valid license to fish, hunt or trap issued pursuant to section 11-0713 of the New York Environmental Conservation Law (See Penal Law § 265.20(a)(6).

Although not stated in the statute, in order to be convicted in New York of illegally possessing a switchblade knife, you must “knowingly” possess the knife (See Model Jury Charge for Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (CJI 2d N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(1); People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 428, 440, 497 N.Y.S.2d 637).

In New York and elsewhere, it’s common for brake parts to be replaced with rebuilt parts. For example, it’s common for garages to install rebuilt brake calipers, brake pads and shoes, master cylinders and power brake boosters. Furthermore, when repairing or maintaining brakes on trucks, its also common to use rebuilt air compressors and brake valves. Therefore, the most important system on any vehicle, the braking system, is routinely repaired and maintained with re-built or refurbished parts. Many times, the parts to be rebuilt (the “cores”) are obtained from salvage yards (junkyards).

However, the New York State Legislature, in its infinite wisdom, has found it necessary to bar the installation of salvaged airbag systems (called inflatable restraint systems under New York law). Effective March 1, 1999, airbag systems in New York may only be replaced with new systems or salvaged systems which have been certified pursuant to standards set by a nationally recognized testing, engineering and research organization (See VTL § 398-d(6)(e) & 415-c (2)).

Here’s the problem with this law; leave it to the New York State Legislature to pass a law requiring salvaged airbag systems to meet standards set by a nationally recognized testing, engineering and research organization when no such standards or organization to develop such standards exist. And, leave it to the New York Court of Appeals to hold that the failure of the Department of Motor Vehicles to develop such standards did not invalidate the law. N.Y.A.A.D., Inc. v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d 245, 771 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. 2003)

In continuing with my commentary on federal mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses and Tilem & Campbell’s challenge to the constitutionality of such sentences, it’s of paramount importance to point out other, influential groups and individuals who are also opposed to mandatory minimums for drug offenses. As previously discussed, former Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were all opposed to mandatory minimums for drug offenses and, at Nixon’s urging, in 1970, Congress abolished almost all mandatory minimum sentencing for federal drug offenses with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.

These former Presidents were not, and are not, the only influential individuals opposed to such sentences. With regard to the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 (both of which contained draconian mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses), a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee found that 92 percent of federal prison wardens who responded were opposed to the mandatory minimum sentences, and 97 percent were opposed to the prohibition against probation or parole. Of the probation officers who responded, 83 percent were opposed to mandatory minimums while 86 percent were opposed to prohibition against probation or parole. Of the federal judges who responded, 73 percent were opposed to mandatory minimums, and 86 percent were opposed to the prohibition against probation or parole.

Many members of law enforcement also supported the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and its elimination of the mandatory minimum sentences found in the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. According to then Congressman William L. Springer (R Ill.): “It is the opinion of most law enforcement people that the harsh mandatory sentences in narcotics law have been a hindrance rather than an aid to enforcement.”

New York criminal lawyer Peter H. Tilem has been admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, effective January 12, 2009. Having been recommended for admission by two current members of the bar of the US Supreme Court the motion for Mr. Tilem’s admission was granted and his admission has taken effect.

The admission of Mr. Tilem to this prestigious bar will enhance the appellate practice of Tilem & Campbell and will give it the ability to challenge cases already in the United States Court of Appeals at the United States Supreme Court level, without seeking outside counsel. Tilem & Campbell has several criminal appeals pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and is currently challenging the mandatory minimums applicable to crack cocaine cases in federal courts.

Tilem & Campbell is currently appealing the constitutionality of the federal mandatory minimums for federal crack offenses and the 100:1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine rationale. In continuing with a thorough review of the failings of prior mandatory minimums for drug offenses, I previously touched on the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969 he supported enforcement of then current drug laws to combat the county’s admitted drug problem. However, he came to realize that was not the best course of action.

(See www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2353&st=&st1=. (Visited December 14, 2008).

Nixon backed away from mandatory minimums and pushed The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (hereinafter the “1970 Act’) through Congress which eliminated all of the mandatory minimum drug sentences but one. (Mandatory minimums from between 10 and 20 to life remained for Engaging in a “continuing criminal enterprise”). The 1970 Act was an acknowledgment of failings of both the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. The 1970 Act was in lock-step with President Kennedy’s aversion to the mandatory minimums, Kennedy’s Commission’s findings against the mandatory minimums and President Lyndon Johnson’s opposition to the mandatory minimums. The Act had wide bi-partisan support including that of then Congressman, and future President of the United States, George H. W. Bush who supported the repeal of the mandatory minimums found in the Narcotics Control Act of 1956.

As I indicated in prior blogs, Tilem & Campbell is currently appealing two cases challenging the constitutionality of the federal mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses and the 100:1 powder cocaine-to-crack cocaine ratio that results in grossly disproportionate sentences between the mostly minority crack offenders and their mostly white powder cocaine cohorts.

One Appellant Brief is already submitted in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and as the drafter of that Brief, I chose to analyze many different sources of information to show that the crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentencing laws (21 USC 841) were based on flawed data and have not achieved their intended goals. In doing so, I analyzed the history of other Congressional Acts imposing draconian mandatory minimums for drug offenses including the Boggs act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. I also discussed President Kennedy’s disfavor for mandatory minimums and the conclusions of a Commission he assembled critical of such sentences and their recommendation that sentences fit both the offender and the offense and that rehabilitation should be the most important goal – not retribution.
I chose this strategy not to fill up space discussing irrelevant long-abolished statutes or the policies’ of Presidents who served 35 to 45 plus years ago but instead to elucidate the fact that the draconian mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for drug offenses has consistently failed over decades and tens of thousands of cases to solve the problem and stem the flow of drugs and their use. It was and remains the objective of my Brief to attack these mandatory minimums not only on strict scrutiny analysis but also on the rationale basis front.

In other words, I want to show the Second Circuit, through solid empirical data, that this mandatory minimum, throw away the key approach has consistently failed; that study after study has concluded that the rational for the mandatory minimums for crack and the 100:1 ratio was flawed and that mandatory minimums have failed for over 57 years to achieve their desired goal; and that the Kennedy Administration, the Johnson Administration and the Nixon Administration all opposed mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders based upon extensive Committee research.

Our Brief followed with commentary regarding the Sentencing Commission’s strong disagreement with the ratio and the mandatory minimums as well as the United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in Kimbrough that the fears were unrealized and that crack and powder cocaine are one in the same drug. Our brief also analyzed and the pending bi-partisan support for Legislation abolishing the ratio. This I argued, supports a strong argument the current laws fail under strict scrutiny analysis because they are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest insofar as all the experts recommend rehabilitation over incarceration and therefore, for a mandatory minimum to be deemed narrowly tailored, it cannot lump all offenders, (both addicts and major suppliers), in the same category.

The mandatory minimums for crack cocaine also fail the rational basis test because we are imprisoning minorities for decades for crack offenses while their white counterpart is receiving less than two years for powder offenses involving 100 times the amount of powder cocaine which, as authoritative experts have determined, is the same drug.

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Tilem & Campbell is currently appealing the constitutionality of the federal crack cocaine statutory mandatory minimum sentences (21 USC 841). In our most recent appeal, we discussed, among other things, the history of mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses starting with the Boggs Act of 1951 and followed by the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. Both Acts imposed onerous mandatory minimum prison terms for relatively minor drug offenses. Both Acts also failed to stem the flow of drugs and their use. We discussed these prior Acts and their utter failures, as well as other empirical data, to support our argument that mandatory minimums for drug offenses have no rational basis.

In 1963, President Kennedy assembled the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse to address the country’s drug problem. Recall, at that time, drug offenders were facing the mandatory minimums found in Narcotics Control Act of 1956. The Commission studied drug use and the laws pertaining to those who abused drugs. The Commission concluded that rehabilitation rather than retributive punishment was essential to addressing the problem.

Regarding sentencing, the Commission opined that penalties should fit both the offender and the offense and be tailored to promote the offender’s rehabilitation. Draconian sentences, concluded the Commission, did not provide an effective deterrence. To the contrary, the Commission observed that the drug users were risking long prisons sentences to get their drugs. In other words, the lengthy mandatory minimums were having little or no affect on drug use.

Tilem & Campbell is vigorously challenging the federal mandatory minimum crack cocaine sentencing scheme found in 21 USC 841. We are currently appealing two cases to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While most believe mandatory minimums were a new concept resulting from the crack cocaine explosion in the early 1980s, the truth is, mandatory minimums for drug offenses have a 57 year history in the United States. As you will learn, from their inception, mandatory minimums have never achieved their desired result.

Draconian mandatory minimums for drug offenses were previously implemented by Congress in 1951 and 1956 and they failed miserably and were ultimately repealed. One thing that is apparent about our government officials including the elected Legislatures, Presidents as well as the appointed members that head our Administrative agencies and the Federal Judiciary is that they simply do not learn from history. It’s as if they don’t even know it.

The Boggs Act of 1951
What Congress was seemingly oblivious to when they slammed through The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (and its draconian mandatory minimums for relatively small amounts of crack cocaine) in the middle of the night, was that approximately 35 years earlier in 1951, Congress had passed the Boggs Act which also had established mandatory minimum prison sentences for drug crimes.

Under the Boggs Act, simple possession of cocaine, heroin or cannabis carried a mandatory minimum 2 years with a maximum 5 years prison term. A second offense carried a mandatory minimum 5 years with a maximum of 10 years in prison. A third offense carried a mandatory minimum of 10 years with a maximum of 15 years in prison. Just as the 1986 ADAA was supported with flawed science, unfounded fears, and outright and erroneous concerns; so too was the Boggs Act and subsequent federal drug laws.

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