Articles Posted in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

If you are facing a serious charge like assault in New York, your right to a fair trial includes more than just a competent defense—it includes how the jury is instructed on evaluating eyewitness testimony. In People v. Salas, the New York Court of Appeals tackled a defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the potential challenges of cross-racial identification. The decision highlights how preserved objections and thorough jury instructions can shape the outcome of a criminal case.

Facts of the Case

The prosecution charged Salas with second-degree assault following a 2019 altercation in Manhattan. During trial, the People relied heavily on testimony from the victim, who identified Salas as his attacker. The identification was made after a single-photo display, and the victim and Salas were of different racial backgrounds.

In People v. Brenda WW, the New York Court of Appeals addressed how the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) should be applied on appeal. Specifically, the Court clarified that while an appellate court has full authority to resentence a defendant under the DVSJA, it may not reduce or eliminate the mandatory postrelease supervision term by crediting excess time already served.

This decision underscores the importance of understanding both the procedural and sentencing implications of the DVSJA for those incarcerated as a result of surviving prolonged abuse.

The Background of the Case

Brenda WW was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, assault, and a weapons offense for killing her abusive husband. She received a sentence of twenty years to life, along with a five-year postrelease supervision term. Years later, she applied for resentencing under the DVSJA, which allows sentencing relief for incarcerated survivors of domestic abuse if they can prove that abuse was a significant factor in their offense.

Brenda presented extensive evidence that her husband had subjected her to years of brutal physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, including cigarette burns, strangulation, and repeated assaults. Based on this history, she argued that her twenty-year sentence was unduly harsh and requested relief under the DVSJA.

Continue reading

In People v. T.P. (2025), the New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for first-degree manslaughter, finding that trial counsel’s failure to object during a highly improper prosecutorial summation deprived the defendant of her right to a fair trial.

Case Summary and Facts

The defendant, referred to as T.P., was charged with first-degree manslaughter under Penal Law § 125.20(1) after she stabbed and killed her boyfriend during a violent confrontation. T.P. contended she acted in self-defense under Penal Law § 35.15, explaining that the victim had repeatedly abused her—physically, sexually, and emotionally—which was corroborated by witnesses and supported by a prior order of protection.

On the night of the incident, the confrontation escalated significantly. According to T.P., her boyfriend forcibly performed oral sex, strangled her, and during the ensuing struggle, fearing for her life, she grabbed a knife and stabbed him once.

Continue reading

In People v. Bacon, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed a long-standing rule: if your defense lawyer fails to raise a specific constitutional objection during trial, you may lose the ability to argue that issue on appeal. This decision is a clear warning to anyone charged with a serious crime—the preservation of your rights depends heavily on the conduct and awareness of your attorney during every stage of trial.  It is essential to use experienced counsel when facing charges in New York.

What Happened in This Case

The case arose from a robbery and assault in Brooklyn. Two victims gave statements to police officers at the scene. One of them, while being treated in an ambulance, described the attackers, including the defendant. The prosecution did not call either victim to testify at trial. Instead, two police officers testified about what the victims had allegedly said, including identifying information about the defendant.

During the trial, defense counsel made only one specific objection to the officers’ testimony: a hearsay objection to a statement by one victim about what the other had said. The court sustained that limited objection. However, no constitutional objection was made under the Confrontation Clause, which protects your right to cross-examine the witnesses against you.

After the prosecution rested, the defense moved for a trial order of dismissal, arguing that the People’s evidence was not sufficient. Counsel mentioned that the jury could not evaluate the female victim’s physical or mental condition, and noted there had been no chance to cross-examine her. Still, the motion focused solely on the quality and sufficiency of the evidence, not on a constitutional violation.

Continue reading

In the state of New York, case law is clear that police officers have the right to approach parked cars for any “objective, credible reason.” This gives officers significant leeway to at least approach vehicles that are stopped and parked. When, though, can the officer demand that the car’s occupant step out of the vehicle?

According to a New York case called People v. Eugenio:

“[w]here .. a vehicle is lawfully parked on the street and neither it nor its occupant is under any restraint, and the police have no grounds to suspect the occupant of criminality at that point, requesting the occupant to step out of the vehicle creates a new, unauthorized restraint.”

In New York, it is well established that to legally stop a vehicle, a police officer must have reasonable suspicion, based on objective evidence, that the car’s occupants were involved in a crime. Courts go back and forth on what it means for an officer to have “reasonable suspicion.” If an officer knows that an area has high crime rates, does this knowledge alone give the officer the required “reasonable suspicion” to stop a vehicle?

A recent opinion published by a New York court affirms that an officer’s general knowledge of crime in an area is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion on its own. In the case, a police officer went to a residence in Queens after reports of an alleged burglary. The 911 call indicated that two men were entering the back of the residence. The officer arrived at the scene and noticed a car in front of the house. The car that was at the residence left the home upon the officers’ arrival. Officers followed the car, stopped and searched the car, and arrested the driver for carrying concealed weapons in the vehicle.

Upon further review, however, the court learned that the officers did not have legal grounds to stop the car. The car’s driver was a female, whereas the burglary suspects were both males. There was nothing indicating that the driver might have been involved in the burglary, and it was not enough for the officers to cite the fact that the neighborhood was a high crime area.

During litigation, it is common for one party to have an expert testify in support of their case. In criminal cases, the state will sometimes try to qualify an arresting police officer as an expert in a certain area, which can bolster the officer’s credibility before the court. What does it take to be qualified as an expert in New York criminal cases? And what does this mean for defendants fighting criminal charges?

New York Case Law

A New York case called People v. Cronin sets out the following standard for expert testimony:

In the state of New York, it is well established that when police officers have a valid warrant from a judge, they are legally allowed to search a resident’s private property whether the resident likes it or not. What happens, though, if the officers do not have a warrant? Can they still get permission to search by asking for consent of the person living in the home?

New York Case Law’s Answer

In answering this question, New York case law is clear:

“‘[T]he police may lawfully conduct a warrantless search when they have obtained the voluntary consent of a party who possesses the requisite degree of authority and control over the premises or personal property in question.'”

Put another way, if a police officer asks for permission to enter a private home, and if a person with “authority” tells him he can search the home, the officer can do so legally. A person with “authority” could be an owner or a resident of the home, whether that person is the suspect of the crime at issue or not. If, however, the officer wants to search a private bedroom, a resident without access to that bedroom might not have the requisite “authority” to let the officer enter. The burden is on the Police and the Prosecutor to establish that there was voluntary consent.

Continue reading

As we have often discussed, one powerful tool that criminal defense attorneys can employ is the motion to suppress incriminating evidence. When a trial court grants a defendant’s motion to suppress, the jury never sees the evidence that the defendant has asked the court to keep out of the trial record. These motions, when successful, can make all the difference for defendants in New York, and they often help defendants win their cases.

How do you know if you, as the defendant, should be filing a motion to suppress? There are several flags that should alert you that there might be grounds for the trial court to suppress incriminating evidence in your case. These include: an unlawful encounter with the police, an officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings, errors in a field sobriety test, and problems with how the State handles evidence before it is admitted in court.  Generally, if the prosecutor wishes t0 use incriminating statements, physical evidence or a police arranged identification as evidence at trial, an experienced criminal defense lawyer will include a request for suppression of that evidence as part of their omnibus motion.

It is also true that if you think there might be a chance the court could grant your motion to suppress, it is often better to present the motion than to hold back. In a recent case before a New York court, the defendant appealed her guilty verdict, arguing she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to file a motion to suppress that could have been successful. The court granted the defendant’s appeal, concluding that the defendant’s attorney failed her by not asking the court to suppress evidence that investigators found in a search that might have exceeded the scope of their warrant.

Continue reading

If you drive on the roads of New York, you are automatically susceptible to police-initiated traffic stops for traffic violations. There is much debate, however, about what circumstances can lead an officer to have “reasonable suspicion” to stop a driver for a traffic stop. Without reasonable suspicion that some law has been violated, police officers are supposedly prohibited from initiating these stops. Can a minor violation in traffic laws give an officer reasonable suspicion under New York law?

Opinion Issued by New York Court

A New York court recently issued an opinion confirming that yes, minor violations in traffic laws can be legal grounds for a traffic stop. In the court’s opinion, it considered a defendant’s argument that his broken headlights and tinted windows were not enough to give an officer reasonable suspicion to stop him while he was driving. Therefore, argued the defendant, any evidence that the officer found in his car during the traffic stop should have been suppressed by the trial court judge in his criminal case.  The two infractions cited by the police for the stop were 0 point traffic infractions.

The court concluded that broken headlights and tinted windows were sufficient grounds for a traffic stop. According to New York traffic law, all motor vehicles must display at least two lighted head lamps on the front. In addition, no motor vehicle is allowed to be covered with material with “light transmittance of less than seventy percent.” The officer’s view of the defendant’s car gave him reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, given the defendant’s broken headlights and tinted windows. The court was unpersuaded by the defendant’s argument that the officer did not actually have a valid reason to stop him while he was driving.

Continue reading

Contact Information