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What are the rights of a parolee when an officer wants to conduct an invasive search or seizure? In New York, recent case law explored this very question, looking at the circumstances under which a defendant can successfully challenge a search based on his constitutional right to privacy. According to the case, parolees do not, in fact, surrender their fundamental constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The case is a win for individuals on parole in New York.

Facts of the Case

The defendant in this case challenged an officer’s search of his pockets. The defendant was on parole, which meant he could be subject to officers searching his home without warning. One day, officer came by his house while looking for a fugitive he suspected might be in the defendant’s home. The officer did not find the fugitive, but the officer did notice a bulge in the defendant’s pocket. The officer then searched the defendant’s person and found heroin in his headphone case. The defendant later faced charges of drug possession.

“Reasonable” Relationship

The court reviewing the facts of the case had to decide whether this search was reasonable. The court first noted that the standard for searches for parolees is different than for those not on parole. According to already-existent New York case law, an officer’s search of a parolee has to do with whether the officer’s conduct was “reasonably related” to that officer’s duty.

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In courtroom proceedings, part of the judge’s job is to be as impartial as possible. We have written blogs before about Judges being reversed for failing to act in an inpartial manner at trial.  In a recent case before a New York court, the defendant argued that the judge failed to perform this duty during the proceedings before the trial court. Looking at the trial court’s record, the higher court agreed, determining that the judge became biased and helped the prosecution argue its case, when, in reality, he should have let the government attorney make the case himself. The higher court granted the defendant a new trial.

Batson Challenges

In criminal proceedings, each side has the opportunity to “strike,” or eliminate, several prospective jurors without cause.  These challenges to a jury are called peremptory, challenges for which you don’t need to give a reason.  .If, however, an attorney strikes a possible juror, and the other side shows that the attorney was operating based on racial discrimination, it becomes the striking attorney’s job to come forward with a reasonable explanation for the decision. The explanation must be what the court calls “race-neutral.” The challenges based on racial discrimination are commonly referred to as Batson challenges.

The Judge’s Role in Batson Challenges

When an attorney challenges the other attorney’s decision to strike a possible juror, the judge’s responsibility is to then let the second attorney make his argument. The argument should be able to show that the decision to strike the juror was not based on race, sex, or ethnicity.

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In 2017, New York case law created a new precedent indicating that when identification is an issue in a criminal case, and when the identifying witness and defendant are seemingly of different races, the defendant is entitled to a charge on “cross-racial identification.”

This means that when a witness identifies a defendant as the person that committed a crime, and when the witness and defendant are of different races, the defendant has certain rights. The defendant can, for example, request expert testimony, specific questioning, or a jury instruction on what it means to identify a person of a different race. The relevant case law is based on the theory that it is easier to make a mistake when identifying a person of a different race.

Assault and Criminal Possession Case

In a recent case before a New York court, the defendant pled not guilty to assault and criminal possession of a weapon. The victim of the assault was the only person who saw the crime happen, and the entire case was built on the victim’s identification of the defendant as the one who assaulted him. Of note, the defendant and the victim were different races.

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We have previously written that police officers, in New York and elsewhere, have what is called a “community caretaking” duty. This means that officers are not only obligated to enforce the law, but they also must assist an individual when they notice that he or she needs help. Recently, a New York court had to decide how this community caretaking responsibility applies to traffic stops on the road.

In the case that led to the court’s decision, an officer was driving behind another vehicle when the officer noticed one of the passenger doors quickly open and close. The officer thought someone in the car might have needed help, and he therefore initiated a traffic stop. Upon approaching the driver, the officer smelled marijuana. He asked the driver about possible drug use, and the driver admitted to having used ecstasy.

Motion to Suppress

The defendant was arrested, and he quickly filed a motion to suppress. The question before the court, then, was this: was the officer’s stop warranted? At the suppression hearing, the prosecution argued that the stop was acceptable under the officer’s community caretaking duty. The officer genuinely thought someone in the car needed help, and therefore the subsequent actions were reasonable. The trial court agreed with the prosecution and denied the motion to suppress.

New York’s New Standard

The higher court disagreed, and it ended up establishing a two-part test to determine if an officer can legally pull over a car under this community caretaking role. First, the officer must point to specific and objective facts that would lead a reasonable officer to think that a vehicle passenger needs help. Second, the police action must be as unintrusive as possible. Therefore, once the police officer realizes that no assistance is needed, he cannot justify further action under his community caretaking responsibility.

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Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The word “unreasonable” can have different meanings in different contexts, but a recent case coming out of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department, provides interesting case law for one of these contexts. The case serves as a reminder that if you ever have doubts about whether you have been unreasonably searched by a police officer, it is never a bad idea to speak with a New York criminal defense attorney to see if you have options to suppress whatever evidence the officer might have found.

Bodily Examinations

The April 2024 case lists out three kinds of bodily examinations (strip searches) that are common after an officer conducts an arrest: the strip search, the “visual body cavity inspection,” and the “manual body cavity search.” A strip search is when an officer has an individual undress and then visually looks over that person’s body. No physical contact is involved. A visual body cavity inspection, on the other hand, is when the officer visually inspects the individual’s body parts below the waistline. In a manual body cavity search, the officer goes so far as to make contact with the person’s genital or anal area to see if that person is hiding anything there.

In order to initiate a manual body cavity search (the most extreme of the three), an officer must have a warrant from the court, except in emergency situations. Courts recognize that this kind of search is a severe intrusion on a person’s right to privacy, therefore making it difficult for an officer to perform this search without a court’s permission.

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When a defendant is charged with committing a violent crime in the state of New York, there are various affirmative defenses he can raise in hopes of reducing both his conviction and the resulting sentence. In a recent criminal case before an appellate court in New York, the defendant successfully asked the court to reduce his murder conviction based on the argument that he acted “under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.” The facts of the case serve as a reminder that this defense applies only in rare circumstances, but that when it does apply, it can serve as a powerful tool in otherwise difficult cases.

The Standard

To successfully argue the affirmative defense of emotional disturbance, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence (1) that he suffered “extreme” emotional disturbance and (2) that there was a reasonable explanation for the emotional disturbance. The first element focuses on the defendant’s mental state, while the second focuses on how the defendant viewed his circumstances at the time of the offense. The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance is different than a psychiatric defense.

April 2024 Case

In the case recently decided by the New York court, the defendant originally argued during trial that he murdered a fellow patient at a medical center because of emotional disturbance. The jury found that this was not a reasonable defense, and it found him guilty.

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If you are questioned in relation to a criminal matter in New York, there are important rights you have under the law. Oftentimes, however, the reality is that state actors do not follow the law when interrogating suspects. If you have faced any kind of interrogation and are now being charged with a crime, one tool available to you is filing a motion to suppress. A defendant can file a motion to suppress to ask the trial court to “suppress,” or get rid of, the record of their statements to the officer questioning them. A successful motion to suppress can then have hugely beneficial effects during the rest of a defendant’s criminal proceedings.

In a recent case before the Appellate Division, Second Department, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements he had given to an officer in connection to several burglaries. While the court ended up denying the defendant’s appeal, the order offers several interesting circumstances that can be grounds for a successful motion to suppress.

The Questioning Officer’s Obligations During Interrogation

When an officer questions a suspect, who is in police custody, regarding a criminal matter, the officer must give that suspect his Miranda warnings – that is, the officer must clearly articulate that the suspect has the right to remain silent and has the right to an attorney. If the suspect waives these rights, he must do so knowingly, and he must understand what he is giving up. If a suspect is held for multiple days or multiple rounds of questioning, the officer has a responsibility to reread the Miranda warnings at reasonable intervals.

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During interrogation, New York detectives and officers are only legally able to obtain statements from defendants that are made voluntarily. If a detective coerces a defendant, or if the defendant does not understand what he or she is being interrogated about, a court may later rule that any confession was involuntarily and thus invalid. A recent case coming out of the Appellate Division, Third Department, shows some of the limits on this law and serves as a reminder of the importance of experienced, qualified counsel in criminal cases.

The Ruling

In the court’s ruling, it first reiterated the law that when prosecuting a criminal case, the State bears the burden of showing that a defendant’s statements during interrogation were voluntary. The State must therefore show that the defendant’s statements were “not products of coercion, either physical or psychological.”

In the case before the court, a defendant was being interrogated about a recent murder. During the interrogation, the defendant asked the questioning officer for medical attention, and the officer refused. Later on in the conversation, the defendant confessed to being involved in the murder, and he ended up pleading guilty to manslaughter in the first degree. Before pleading guilty, however, he filed a motion to suppress the confession, which the trial court denied.

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In a procedurally complex case, the New York Court of Appeals recently issued a decision reversing an appellate court’s decision in favor of the criminal defendant. The defendant originally faced charges after he broke into a college dormitory, supposedly attempting to sexually assault girls in the dormitory. At trial, the defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary but acquitted of a second offense, “burglary in the second degree as a sexually motivated felony.” He appealed; the appellate court reversed; and the New York Court of Appeals ultimately reversed again to reinstate the defendant’s conviction of burglary in the second degree.

Burglary v. Burglary as a Sexually Motivated Felony

The state first charged the defendant with “burglary in the second degree as a sexually motivated felony.” Under this charge, the prosecution would have to show that the defendant 1) committed the burglary and 2) committed the burglary because, in substantial part, of his own sexual gratification.

Film producer Harvey Weinstein’s rape conviction has been highly publicized and scrutinized for several years, and on April 25, 2024, the New York Court of Appeals issued an opinion that has elicited even more outrage surrounding the proceedings. In its opinion, the court decided that Weinstein is entitled to a new trial, which means a new judge and new prosecutor will likely appear for the proceedings. As part of the trial, the court will also reconsider Weinstein’s 23-year sentence.

Basis for the Original Trial

Weinstein’s original proceedings were based on three sex crimes against three individuals. During the trial, the prosecution argued that the defendant abused his power and fame to take advantage of female actors, coercing them into unwanted sexual acts. The theory of the case was that Weinstein offered these women assistance with their careers in exchange for his demands. The case proceeded to trial in 2020.

A jury convicted Weinstein of first-degree criminal sexual act and third-degree rape. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 23 years in prison, plus five years of post-release supervision. He has been incarcerated for the last several years.

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